The unprecedented access offered by the World Wide Web brings with it the potential to gather huge amounts of data on human activities. Here we exploit this by using a toy model of financial markets, the Minority Game (MG), to investigate human speculative trading behaviour and information capacity. Hundreds of individuals have played a total of tens of thousands of game turns against computer-controlled agents in the Web-based Interactive Minority Game. The analytical understanding of the MG permits fine-tuning of the market situations encountered, allowing for investigation of human behaviour in a variety of controlled environments. In particular, our results indicate a transition in players' decision-making, as the markets become more difficult, between deductive behaviour making use of short-term trends in the market, and highly repetitive behaviour that ignores entirely the market history, yet outperforms random decision-making. 02.50.Le; 89.65.Gh; 89.70.+c Keywords: Decision theory and game theory; Economics and financial markets; Information theory;
By coincidence, a theoretical approach has been developed by the statistical physics community for an independently created game that has many similarities to the market entry class: the Minority Game (MG) [17] . Economic agents are endowed with simple strategies and learn inductively, as suggested by Arthur [18] . A rich market dynamics emerges, whose properties depend on only a few simple parameters [19] [20] [21] . These results have recently led some authors to return to more traditional experiments, playing the MG with small groups of humans [22, 23] .
Our approach here has instead been to make use of the understanding of the theoretical game, by having individual humans play against computer-controlled "MG agents". We can thus fine-tune the market situation the player encounters, and provide a variety of controlled environments in which to investigate human behaviour. Because we only ever engage individual players, we have been able to make use of the immense access provided by the World Wide Web 1 , presenting the game via an online interface. Since being launched a year ago [25] , hundreds of players have played a total of tens of thousands of game turns in the Interactive Minority Game.
The player is presented with a "price" history of the past 50 time steps of a market ( Fig. 1 ) in which he is one of N traders, the others being MG agents. At each time step t, each individual i must choose independently, based on the market history, between two actions, a i (t) = +1 or -1 (say, "buy" or "sell") 2 . They then receive points given by the formula,
where
is the aggregate action of the population at time t. Thus, those whose choice is in the minority gain |A(t)| points, and those in the majority lose this amount; a player's average gain per turn,
, can be taken as a measure of his success. (Note that the Minority Game is a non-zero sum game.) From the values A(t) we can generate the price history 3 shown to the human player [26, 27] ,
Five different markets are available to choose from, whose names give a rough order of increasing difficulty. Broadly these can be divided into two groups, determined by a control parameter Each market consists of N = 95 players, including the human. All were started with a 1000-turn introductory period with computer-controlled agents only; the subsequent interactive games are continuous, with each player picking up the price history where the last leaves it. Thus, a continuous price history (Eq. 2) of each market can be generated 4 . As a first step to analysing human performance, one can consider the human player's rank in the game compared to the computer-controlled agents (Fig. 2) . A marked difference can be observed depending on the market phase. In the symmetric-phase markets humans almost always gain rank 1, clearly exploiting information the MG agents cannot see, while in the asymmetric markets humans do much worse, with most players being located in the lower half of the ranks (though their performance spans the complete range of possibilities)-a much fairer game.
An alternative point of view is given by considering humans' average gain per turn in the game, as compared to average gain per turn for the regular MG agents and other types of computer-controlled player. One can use the distribution of scores as a function of rank among other humans, which we display for Easy and Apprentice levels ( Fig. 3a) , or (to better compare to computer-controlled players) the cumulative distribution of scores, which we display for Guru level (Fig. 3b) . In the former case humans can easily exploit the herding effects in the market, doing much better than most MG agents and usually better than even the best MG agent. The latter, fairer market proves much more difficult: human performance covers a range from the very lowest to the very highest scores achieved by MG agents, but the MG agents generally do better (reflecting the results of Fig. 2) . In all cases, however, humans do consistently better than random decisionmaking ("noise trading").
Insight into human decision-making processes can be gained by information-theoretic analysis. If we denote by ) ( * t a the human's action at time t, and µ m (t) the market history of length m preceding this decision, then predictability of human action can be measured by the information entropy [28] 
More conveniently, we can use the information gain ratio
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The Interactive Minority Game 4 which gives us extremal values I m = 1 and 0, meaning respectively that human action is completely predictable or completely random with respect to market histories of length m. Fig. 4 shows how I m changes with m at different levels, both over the entire continuous market history (left) and for handpicked players with high scores (right) who had each played around 1000 turns. When computer-controlled agents have shorter memory values I m (the Easy and Apprentice levels), all humans are able to spot these values and exploit resulting patterns, playing as if they were basing most of their decisions on market histories of length M + 1. This is particularly noticeable for the handpicked players, for whom the discontinuities in I m are very large at Easy and Apprentice levels, and marked even at Trader-indicating considerable exploitation of patterns in the market.
In the more difficult levels, as agents' memory is increased, no clear discontinuities in I m can be observed. Instead players tend to ignore the market history entirely and simply repeat their immediately preceding action with large probability (~0.8 at Professional and Guru). This repetitive behaviour is even stronger among the handpicked players. Further analysis shows that while human decisions in the easier markets are correlated with the long-term trend of the market, this correlation decreases as the markets become more difficult, being close to zero at Professional and Guru levels. Thus, at these levels players appear to be ignoring all aspects of the information presented by the market. This behaviour in the more difficult markets reflects the observations of other authors on humans playing the Minority Game in groups [22, 23] , but in our case the tendency to repetition is even stronger.
A final point of view is provided by examining the human's market impact, by considering how volatility and the average gain per turn of computer-controlled agents change as the human enters and leaves. The former can be measured by the normalized variance of the market fluctuations:
In the easier markets a good player can consistently decrease N 2 σ , most obviously at Easy level (Fig. 5, dotted line) but also observable at Apprentice. This has the unintended benefit of actually increasing the gain of the computer-controlled players (Fig. 5, solid line) : thus, a symbiosis exists between the "selfish" human and the MG agents, who gain from a speculator decreasing volatility by exploiting market inefficiencies they cannot themselves observe. So to speak, the human is "doing good by doing well". By contrast at Trader, Professional and Guru levels the effect of the human player is too small to make any clear statement. Since volatility at Trader level is still greater-than-random, this suggests that there is a limit to untrained humans' ability to arbitrage: when volatility is below a certain level, there is not much they can do to decrease it further, despite inefficiencies still being present.
In summary, whereas most studies of market entry games have concentrated in the main on whether players can coordinate to an equilibrium [9, 11, 18] , the different controlled environments provided by the analytically understood Minority Game allow for quantitative measurement of important factors in economic decision-making. The Laureti/Ruch/Wakeling/Zhang
The Interactive Minority Game 5 differences in performance between the levels are likely to be in part a result of the different memory values of computer-controlled agents, suggesting that humans may have a maximum length of market history over which they are able to consider patterns. However, emphasis must also be put on the smaller fluctuations in the more difficult markets, which mean that short-term patterns cannot survive for long under market impact. The transition we observe, based on the market phase, between behaviour utilizing short-term patterns in the market and the long-term direction of price movement, and simple repetitive behaviour that ignores all aspects of the market history, provides a confirmation of Arthur's suggestion [18] that beyond a certain level of complexity human logical capacity can no longer cope. When observed elsewhere in human economic decision-making, repetitive behaviour has been criticized as "illogical" [22] , as it potentially provides information that competitors could exploit. Yet, as we have seen here, this behaviour actually consistently outperforms random actions, which provide no such information. This might suggest that the transition is not between learning and ignorance, but between two different types of learning, the deductive and inductive. . The solid histogram shows MG agents' average gain per turn over the different periods (right axis), with an observable benefit being derived from the human speculator's presence.
